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This bold and invigorating work presents a rigorous argument for a version of moral education 
which aims to bring it about both that children subscribe to moral standards in their conative, 
affective and behavioural dispositions and believe them to be justified.  It also sets out with 
refreshing clarity the main obstacle to this aim, namely that there is reasonable disagreement 
about both the content and justification of morality, yet teaching propositions as true, or 
standards as justified, when there is reasonable disagreement about them is indoctrinatory 
(indoctrination being defined here as imparting beliefs by non-rational means).  Three common 
attempts to deal with this problem – moral education is unnecessary; a bit of indoctrination is 
not so bad; simply teach about morality rather than in it – are crisply dismissed.  Hand also 
effectively rules out second-order arguments for subscribing to a moral code based on 
consensus and convergence: only non-indoctrinatory directive moral enquiry will do the job 
and that is possible only if there is a robust first-order justification for subscription that children 
can grasp.  
Fortunately, Hand argues, moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some moral 
standards are indeed robustly justified by a contractarian theory based on what Copp has called 
‘the problem of sociality’.  Left unchecked, the combination of three features of the human 
condition – rough equality, limited sympathy and moderately scarce resources – lead to conflict 
and a breakdown in trust and cooperation.  If we are to live in peaceful and productive groups, 
we need the kind of motivation that only full commitment to universally-enlisting and penalty- 
endorsing moral standards can provide.  These standards are, therefore, rationally justified and 
parents and teachers can engage in moral formation and directive moral enquiry without being 
charged with indoctrination. 
It is an argument which is for the main firmly located within a Kantian and neo-Kantian 
framework (plus a strong reliance on Humean sympathy).  It views morality in terms of 
prohibited, permitted and required actions based on rational rules (Hand thinks we are ‘rule-
following creatures’ p.19), and views reason as both universal and universally understood as 
such.  Within this framework, Hand constructs his theory with precision and care and his 
position has many strengths, particularly in its admirable refusal to duck tough questions.  
Teachers should engage in directive moral enquiry (though perhaps by tactful, nondidactic 
means) to steer children away from unsound standards and unjustified arguments, even if that 
means going against what is being taught at home: ‘it is more important to make children aware 
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that they are not obliged to accept any proposition or standard without reason than it is to spare 
them the discomfort of disagreement between their parents and teachers’ (p.81).  He is also 
honest about the need to ‘own the unloveliness’ of moral formation and directive enquiry: yes, 
it sometimes involves fear, guilt, shame and condemnation, but these emotions and acts do 
necessary work.  Furthermore, their role should not be exaggerated: Hand claims that the 
community-sustaining rules he advocates are not unduly onerous and that his theory still allows 
plenty of time for fun. 
 
Nevertheless, even on its own terms, there are concerns that need to be raised.  Hand addresses 
three of the standard objections to contractarian moral theories – how to deal with the nihilist, 
the free-riders and the infirm – but his responses are not fully convincing.  Some of us may feel 
that current and recent events suggest that there are more moral arsonists than just the ‘few 
benighted souls’ that Hand acknowledges (p.66), and still less that nihilists and free-riders are 
just ‘figments of the philosophical imagination’.  Not everyone wants to survive, or even for 
their children to survive.  As for the free-riders, a particularly dangerous subset of these is not 
addressed by Hand, namely those who believe themselves to be a superior elite who do not 
need to abide by the mundane rules that apply to lesser mortals.  Issues arising from infirmity 
are regularly a problem for contractarian theories based on reason: if the mentally infirm cannot 
metaphorically sign up to the contract, how are they to be included in the moral sphere?  Hand 
says that the boundaries between firm and infirm are often blurred, and although that is true, 
there are still many cases which are clear and troubling. Hand’s faith in human – and Humean 
– sympathy – is required to do a lot here.   
Two fundamental questions, moreover, are not discussed by Hand.  Firstly, he takes it for 
granted that community-sustaining behaviours and the rules that underpin them are good, but 
this is not always the case: some communities are toxic and their structures should not be 
prolonged.  Sometimes cooperation works to promote evil ends and conflict may be necessary 
to combat those ends.  Secondly, Hand talks (p.63) of ‘the basic moral standards to which 
almost everyone does, in fact, subscribe.’  These include ‘prohibitions on killing, causing harm, 
stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, requirements to treat others fairly, keep one’s 
promises and help those in need.’  Yet it is not clear to me that all these standards are in fact 
required to sustain a community, at least in a minimal sense of survival (I do not talk of 
flourishing).  And, even if they were, they would not prevent members of that community from 
behaving very badly to those they perceived to be outside it (even if the excluded occupied the 
same geographical space).  This problem is exacerbated by the burgeoning of virtual 
communities.  Hand talks often of ‘we’, but just who comprises this ‘we’?  What are the size 
and location of the community/communities in question? 
Hand says he wants to concentrate on the content and justification of morality rather than the 
applicability of standards to particular cases (such as issues to do with moral dilemmas and 
borderline cases) because he thinks such issues are often overplayed in moral theories and give 
a false impression that morality is always very difficult.  However, a greater sensitivity to issues 
of context can in some cases help us decide on the standards. Such a move, of course, would 
take Hand further away from Kantian deontology and towards an Aristotelian ethics and 
politics of flourishing, which may not be where he wants to go – although it would allow him 
3 
 
to include arguments for moral behaviour based on the fulfilment of our emotional, imaginative 
and intellectual potential, and to talk more of pleasurable carrots as well as sticks. 
Nevertheless, despite these questions and concerns, A Theory of Moral Education is lucid, 
incisive and greatly repays careful study.  It often made me reappraise – sometimes 
uncomfortably – my own parenting and teaching, even though my child and my students are 
of university-age.  The world is hardly suffering from an excess of reasoned morality at present, 
and the need for moral education is as urgent as it has ever been.  Hand has provided a bracing 
and necessary shot across the bows. 
 
 
